BHP Group Limited v Impiombato & Anor

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal in *BHP Group Limited v Impiombato & Anor*. The dispute concerned the proper interpretation of section 134(1)(d) of the *Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988* (Cth) (the SRC Act), which provides for compensation for an employee's incapacity for work. The primary issue was whether an employee's entitlement to compensation under this section was limited to the period during which they were *incapable* of performing their pre-injury employment, or if it extended to periods where they were capable of performing *some* form of employment, even if not their pre-injury role.

The High Court was required to determine whether the phrase "incapable of undertaking, after the injury, any employment" in section 134(1)(d) of the SRC Act meant incapable of undertaking *any* employment whatsoever, or merely incapable of undertaking the *specific employment* in which the employee was engaged at the time of the injury. This interpretation was crucial for determining the duration of the employee's entitlement to compensation for incapacity.

The Court reasoned that the plain language of section 134(1)(d) indicated that compensation was payable for incapacity for work. It held that "any employment" in the provision referred to any form of employment, not just the employee's pre-injury employment. Therefore, an employee was entitled to compensation for incapacity if they were unable to undertake *any* employment, not just their former role. The Court applied the principle of statutory interpretation that words in legislation should be given their ordinary and natural meaning unless a contrary intention appears.

The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Full Federal Court were set aside.