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JUDGMENT No. ........ . ........ ...-
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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA -- )
- l
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. G.354 of 1983 )
GENERAL DIVISION ) IN THE MATTER OF THE TRADE
PRACTICES ACT 1974BETWEEN: CAROL ANN BELL
Applicant
AND : AUSTRALIAN EAGLE Il<SURA:iCL
COMPANY LIMITED
First Respondent,
Cross Claimant
.- !,EDILJA DUST?>:<SS 'i7?573".5 P Y Y LIMITED
Second Respondent
KOBERT MEDINA
Thlrd Respondent,'
Cross Respondent
EX TEMPOPE REASOKS FOR INTERLOCUTORY JUDGKEtIT ALLOWING IN PRINCIPLE AMENDMCi<T OF CROSS-CLA1l.l
- . . . - - - - -.-p
confined to an arnend~ent of the contrartuaj ccu:?t :,.l-rlcl-r I ' :>.l? BURCIIETT J.
It seems to me that I should !lot pcrmi'; an ;~men?rne,-rt
which would raisc a nc., count 1: t o ~ t , . hlrh is quite r~ ; s i d r anything suggested bp the existing pleadings; at this late stay-, naving regard to the prejudice that may arise and tti~c clc!:~y c n d
the effect upon the disposal of the I-,.n.i~~g, I d.r, n o i !l-r;n,, i
should permit that. I t ::-re pleadinq we.-? l - e d ~ a f t ~ d , so 5.7 i: l:?
t h e c r o s s - c l a i m a l r e a d y t o r a i s e , i n e f f e c t s l m p l y a l l e g i n g more
/
| ,/ | f u l l y | t h e | t e r m s | of | t h e | same | c o n t r a c t | and | a n o t h e r | b r e a c h , | a p a r t |
from t h e b r e a c h t h a t h a s a l r e a d y been a l l e g e d , t h i s mlght make
t h e p o s i t i o n somewhat different.
D e s p i t e t h e e l o q u e n t a rgument whlch h a s been p u t by Mr
F l i c k , I do n o t q u i t e s e e how t h e cross-examination of t h e
a p p l i c a n t h e r s e l f and h e r w i t n e s s c o u l d r e a l l y have been
s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t e d by t h e a b s e n c e of a c o u n t of t h a t k l n d
from t h e c r o s s - c l a i m . I t may n e v e r t h e l e s s be t h a t i n p a r t i c u l a r
r e s p e c t s t h e conduc t o f t h e c a s e may have been d i f f e r e n t , a n d , o f
c o u r s e , I a c c e p t c o u n s e l ' s a s s u r a n c e t h a t , i n h l s o p i n i o n , i t
would have been d i f f e r e n t i n some r e q p e ' t s . However, t h a t c a n n n t
be a l l o w e d t o prc--em?t 1 q u e s t ~ c r . of t ! _ ~ 5 1 c ~ n i t i c a n r e of thri d i f f e r e n c e , whlch 1s a m a t t e r on which I have t o make some determination.
I t h i n k a m a t t e r which ough t t o be g i v e n considerable
w e l g h t i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n i s t h e pos i t i c n of t h e applicant, whose
c a s e s h o u l d n o t be d e f e r r e d by r e a s o n of a n e l e v e n t h - h o u r
amendment i n r e s p e c t o f a c r o s s - c l a i m a s between t h c r e s p o n d e n t s .
I t h i n k t h a t j u s t i c e would b e s t be met i n t h i s situation by indicating t h a t I would be p r c p a r e ? , i n p r l n c l p l e , L:] p e r m i t G
p r o p e r l y p l e a d e d c o n t r a c t u a l r c c n , t l L r:n 1-y t h r
c r o s s - c l a l m a n t a l o n g t h e l i n e s t h d t :?age been ~ n d i c a t c : l ~ n a rgumen t ; b u t s u b l e c t t o t h e r l g h t c f t h ? c l - ? s s - r e s p o n d e ~ i t zo
a r g u e t h a t I c o u l d u l t i m a t e l y e.\ei-ci;c 1 d ~ ~ c ~ e t i f ~ l i L J L 1 5
r e l a t e d , n o t t c t h e r a t t e r s t h a t 11;;.;.1 b ? e n d ~ s ~ u s ; ~ t l > , b u t 1:q expiry of a statute of limitations. I think I should reserve that right. In addition, I would reserve to the cross-respondent the right, of course, to argue that the statutes of limitations, upon the proper application of the principles relating to the operation of those statutes in relation to amendments, would prevent the amendment belng made at this stage.
I would reserve those questions to flnal argument, therefore, and, subject to them, permit a case to be advanced by the cross-claimant, such as I have indicated.
It would also be subject to leave to Mr rllcL to seek at a later stage of the hearing, after the amrndm?,it ! :as nec?n actually formall:cd, an adlournnent f tt? c~oss-cl;im, if nc then thinks he requires it. That would be on the footlng that any adjournment would not delay the application; but :iould, if that were done, inevitably involve a splittlncj of tht, hearing, which I would have to continue at some later date in respect of the cross-clalm.
I have not discussed in detail the questions of
discretion which have been raised in argument, but I have taken
into account the delay (which has been c_~lte consitlerablc! on 1ihlc11 ilr rllck placed reliance; tlxt L!ic ?1-3ad:ng sc:Ign. n2.1 is be re1:ed upon could have been ra:secl irl,nout dlf'ic~tlty icry
much earlier; and the preludice, on ;:hi cn h~ clddress?cl ? L s:-,me length, arising out of the conduct of t h e case !hu: f a r w~tkos, thls matter ha'llnq been ralsed u11t11, a!:!:avcncly, s h n r L ~ y beLcr? he came to court this mornlng. I th:nl: 'uhsta!it~;~lly tllc other matters upon which he relied have been advcrted to already.
I c e r t i f y t h a t t h e p r e c e d i n g
t h r e e ( 3 ) p a g e s a r e a t r u e
c o p y o f t h e R e a s o n s f o r
Judgment h e r e i n o f h i s Honour
Mr J u s t i c e B u r c h e t t .
D a t e d : f 6 A u g u s t 1 9 8 9
C o u n s e l f o r t h e A p p l i c a n t : M K C . A . Ylng
S o l i c i t o r s f o r t h e A p p l i c a n t : S c h r a d e r & A s s o c i a t e s C o u n s e l f o r t h e r i r s t R e s p o n d e n t : ~ i s s P . Dercj in
S o l i c i t o r s f o r t h e F i r s t Responden t , ,
C r o s s C l a i m a n t . i l a l l e s o n s Stel ,hen J a c ~ u e q C o u n s p l Ecr t h n S ~ c c n d R e s p o n d ~ n t a n d
T h i r d S c s ? c :Le.:: <: toss Fe=,ponderi t : n r G . r11r7.
S o l i c i t o r s f q r t h e Second RespondenL
a n d T h i r d R e s p o n d e n t ' C r o s s S e s p c n c l e n t : I . l i n t e r E l l ? ; o n
- AGLC
- Bell, C.A. v Australian Eagle Insurance Company Ltd [1989] FCA 485
- Case
- [1989] FCA 485
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the matter of justice in the circumstances, weighing the position of the applicant against the delay and prejudice to the respondents. Justice Burchett concluded that while the delay was considerable, and the hearing could have been raised much earlier, the applicant's case should not be deferred due to an eleventh-hour amendment to the cross-claim. The court allowed the amendment in principle, subject to certain conditions. These conditions included the right of the cross-respondent to argue that the amendment should be precluded due to the expiry of a statute of limitations and the possibility of an adjournment to the cross-claim if required. The court also noted that any adjournment should not delay the application but could result in a splitting of the hearing.
In summary, the court permitted the amendment of the cross-claim to include additional contractual claims, subject to the cross-respondent's right to argue against the amendment on the grounds of statute of limitations and the possibility of an adjournment if necessary. The court balanced the interests of the applicant and the respondents, ultimately deciding that justice would best be met by allowing the amendment with these conditions.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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