Behrendt & Cadenet (No. 2)

In *Behrendt & Cadenet (No. 2)*, Harper J of the Family Court of Australia considered an application by the father for the appointment of a fresh single expert to prepare an updated Family Report. The existing single expert had previously prepared a Family Report which raised concerns regarding the father's alleged access to pornographic material, necessitating the engagement of further experts. Orders had been made for these experts to be engaged before the preparation of an updated Family Report by the original single expert. The father sought the appointment of a new expert, claiming a loss of confidence in the existing expert, while the mother and Independent Children's Lawyer opposed this application.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the father had established sufficient grounds to warrant the discharge of the existing single expert and the appointment of a new one. This involved determining if the father's asserted loss of confidence was based on apprehended bias or a genuine inability of the expert to perform their role impartially, particularly in light of the father's perception of flaws in the expert's reasoning regarding certain USB materials and their probative value. The court was also required to consider whether the father's arguments about the probative value of the evidence were relevant to the question of the expert's suitability.

Harper J rejected the father's application, finding that his asserted loss of confidence was primarily rooted in apprehended bias rather than any demonstrable inability of the expert to conduct their role impartially. The court noted that the father's arguments regarding the probative value of the USB materials were not a valid basis for discharging the expert, as such issues could arise with any expert and were not determinative of the expert's suitability. The judge referred to previous decisions and the principle that an expert's untested evidence appearing to be at odds with a party's version of logical reasoning does not constitute a ground for disqualification. The court found that the father's perception of flawed reasoning by the expert did not equate to bias or an inability to form an opinion based on evidence.

Consequently, the court ordered that the father's application be dismissed.