Behrendorff v Soblusky

This case concerned an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia following a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The plaintiff, Mr. Soblusky, had been injured while travelling in a car that he had exchanged under a hire-purchase agreement with the first defendant, Mr. Behrendorff. The car was being driven by the second defendant, Mr. Lewis, at Mr. Soblusky's request. Mr. Soblusky brought an action against both Mr. Behrendorff, as the registered owner of the vehicle, and Mr. Lewis, claiming damages for his injuries.

The central legal issue before the court was the interpretation and application of section 3(2) of The Motor Vehicles Insurance Act 1936 (Q.). This provision deemed any person in charge of a motor vehicle, other than the owner, to be the owner's authorised agent acting within the scope of their authority, for the purposes of claims for accidental bodily injury. The applicants, Mr. Behrendorff and his insurer, contended that Mr. Lewis, the driver, was not "in charge" of the vehicle within the meaning of the Act, and further argued that even if he was deemed to be Mr. Behrendorff's agent, he was also acting as Mr. Soblusky's agent, thereby negating Mr. Behrendorff's vicarious liability.

The High Court, in refusing special leave to appeal, affirmed the reasoning of the Full Court. The Court held that section 3(2) of the Act created a statutory agency that imputed liability to the owner, Mr. Behrendorff, irrespective of the actual relationship between Mr. Lewis and Mr. Soblusky. The Court found that the argument that Mr. Lewis was also Mr. Soblusky's agent did not intercept the statutory liability imposed on Mr. Behrendorff. Furthermore, the Court considered the argument that Mr. Lewis was not "in charge" of the vehicle to be primarily a question of fact, and given that Mr. Lewis was in full control of the car and this point was not raised before the Full Court, special leave was not warranted to canvass this issue.

Consequently, the application for special leave to appeal was refused with costs.