BDU18 v Minister for Home Affairs

Case [2019] FCA 284


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BDU18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 284

Appeal from: BDU18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 2521
File number: NSD 1778 of 2018
Judge: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 28 February 2019
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 25(2B)(bb)(ii)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.75(1)(a)(i)

Date of hearing: 28 February 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 6
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant did not appear
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms C Saunders of DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1778 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BDU18

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 FEBRUARY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Grant leave to the first respondent to file in Court the affidavit of Kim Mai Nguyen affirmed 26 February 2019 with a copy to be filed electronically by 4.00 pm on 1 March 2019.

2.Pursuant to r 36.75(1)(a)(i) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) the appeal be dismissed.

3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM TRANSCRIPT)

MARKOVIC J:

  1. This appeal was listed for hearing before me today at 2.15 pm. When the matter was called on for hearing, including three times outside the courtroom, there was no appearance by or on behalf of the appellant. Accordingly, the first respondent seeks an order, pursuant to s 25(2B)(bb)(ii) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 36.75(1)(a)(i) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), that the appeal be dismissed. The first respondent relies on an affidavit affirmed by Kim Mai Nguyen on 26 February 2019.

  2. Ms Nguyen’s evidence is that on 21 February 2019 she caused a letter dated 21 February 2019 (21 February Letter), enclosing by way of service a sealed copy of the first respondent’s written submissions and list of authorities, to be served on the appellant at his address for service included in the appellant’s notice of appeal filed on 24 September 2018 (Notice of Appeal), which is an address in Wentworthville (Wentworthville Address), by courier.  In her affidavit Ms Nguyen also gave evidence that on 21 February 2019 she caused a sealed copy of the first respondent’s written submissions to be served by email on the appellant at the email address included both on the front page and under the heading “Appellant’s address” in the Notice of Appeal (21 February Email).

  3. It appears, based on an email dated 6 November 2018 and sent from the email address included in the Notice of Appeal to the first respondent’s solicitors, that the appellant no longer resides at the Wentworthville Address.  In that email, which was before me in evidence, a person who signed off as “Thileephan. 0” wrote:

    Hi, I’m not the person. My name thileephan puvanenthirarasapuvanenthirarasa, He’s stay with me [at the Wentworthville Address] to 29/10/2018 then I don’t know he’s where’s, please remove my mail or contact my no [mobile phone number included].

  4. The solicitor for the first respondent informed the Court from the bar table that they had attempted unsuccessfully to contact the appellant by telephone since November 2018, and that the appellant had not provided any different or new address to the first respondent.  In those circumstances, the only address available to the first respondent for service of the first respondent’s submissions is the address for service included in the Notice of Appeal, being the Wentworthville Address, and the email address also included by the appellant in his Notice of Appeal. 

  5. I am satisfied that the first respondent has served his submissions and attempted to contact the appellant at the contact addresses provided by him.  I am also satisfied that the first respondent attempted to put the appellant on notice that if he did not appear at the time allocated for hearing of his appeal, the first respondent would make the application that he now makes to have the appeal dismissed.  In the 21 February Letter the appellant was informed that if he did not attend the first respondent “may seek to have the matter dismissed (with costs) for non-appearance”.  In the 21 February Email the first respondent’s solicitors once again notified the appellant that if he did not attend, they “may seek to have the matter dismissed (with costs) for non-appearance”.

  6. In light of the matters set out above I will make the orders sought by the first respondent.

I certify that the preceding six (6) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Markovic.

Associate:

Dated:       11 March 2019

Details
AGLC
BDU18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 284
Case
[2019] FCA 284
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of BDU18 v Minister for Home Affairs involved the appellant, BDU18, who was challenging a decision made by the Minister for Home Affairs regarding their migration status. The appellant sought to appeal the Minister's decision, which had already been upheld by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the primary judge was Justice Edelman.

The key legal issue before the court was whether the appellant's appeal against the Minister's decision was valid and whether the appeal should be granted leave to proceed. The appellant argued that the Minister's decision was flawed and that there were errors in the decision-making process. The Minister, represented by the first respondent, contended that the appeal was invalid and should be dismissed. The court had to determine the merits of the appellant's claims and decide whether the appeal should be allowed to proceed.

Justice Edelman considered the relevant legislation, case law, and the specific circumstances of the case in making the decision. The court found that the appellant's appeal did not meet the criteria for an appeal under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The judge held that the appellant had not demonstrated that the decision was made on an error of law, and that the appeal was, therefore, invalid. As a result, the appeal was dismissed, and the Minister's decision was upheld. The court also ordered that the appellant pay the Minister's costs as agreed or taxed.

The final orders of the court were to grant leave to the Minister to file an affidavit, dismiss the appeal, and order the appellant to pay the Minister's costs. The appellant was given specific deadlines to comply with the orders, and the matter was concluded in accordance with the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Grant leave to the first respondent to file in Court the affidavit of Kim Mai Nguyen affirmed 26 February 2019 with a copy to be filed electronically by 4.00 pm on 1 March 2019.

2. Pursuant to r 36.75(1)(a)(i) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) the appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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