Barton v Commissioner for Motor Transport

In *Barton v Commissioner for Motor Transport*, the High Court of Australia considered a claim by an interstate transport operator seeking to recover moneys paid for permits issued under the *State Transport (Co-ordination) Act 1931* (NSW). The plaintiff argued that these payments were invalid due to s 92 of the Commonwealth Constitution, which guarantees freedom of interstate trade, commerce, and intercourse. The defendant, the Commissioner for Motor Transport, contended that the action was barred by s 27 of the *Transport (Division of Functions) Act 1932* (NSW), which imposed a one-year limitation period for actions against commissioners or persons acting under that Act or other specified Acts.

The central legal issues before the High Court were: firstly, whether the Commissioner for Motor Transport qualified as a "Commissioner appointed under" the *Transport (Division of Functions) Act 1932* or a person acting under that Act or another specified Act, such that s 27 would apply to bar the plaintiff's claim; and secondly, whether a retrospective amendment to s 27 in 1956, which explicitly extended its provisions to actions for the recovery of moneys paid under colour of statutory authority, was valid and applicable to the plaintiff's claim, particularly in light of s 92 of the Constitution.

A majority of the High Court (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Webb, and Kitto JJ) held that the action was not barred by s 27 of the *Transport (Division of Functions) Act 1932*. Their reasoning was that the Commissioner for Motor Transport was not appointed under that specific Act, but rather under subsequent legislation. Furthermore, the Court found that the Commissioner had acted under the *State Transport (Co-ordination) Act 1931*, which did not confer powers on a commissioner appointed under the *Transport (Division of Functions) Act 1932*. Consequently, the Commissioner did not fall within the scope of s 27 as it originally stood. The majority also found that the 1956 amendment to s 27, which sought to retrospectively bar such claims, was invalid in its application to causes of action that had already accrued more than twelve months prior to its enactment, for reasons consistent with previous decisions concerning the retrospective barring of claims under s 92 of the Constitution.

The Court ordered that the questions in the special case be answered in accordance with these findings, effectively allowing the plaintiff's claim to proceed as it was not barred by the relevant limitation provisions.