Barrett v Coroner's Court of South Australia

The Supreme Court of South Australia, constituted by Anderson, White, and Peek JJ, heard an application for judicial review concerning the Deputy State Coroner's decision to conduct an inquest into the death of a newborn infant. The applicant, a midwife who assisted in a planned home birth, challenged the Coroner's jurisdiction, arguing the infant's death was not a "reportable death" under the *Coroner's Act 2003* (SA). The central dispute revolved around whether the infant, declared dead due to hypoxia after being born without visible signs of life, met the criteria for a reportable death, particularly in light of the common law "born alive rule" and the presence of pulseless electrical activity (PEA).

The court was required to determine whether the Deputy State Coroner possessed jurisdiction to hold the inquest. This involved considering whether the infant's death constituted a "reportable death" as defined by the *Coroner's Act 2003* (SA). A key legal issue was the application of the common law "born alive rule" to the circumstances, and specifically, whether the detection of pulseless electrical activity (PEA) could be considered a sign of life for the purposes of this rule, thereby establishing the infant as having been "born alive" and thus subject to the Coroner's jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the application for judicial review, affirming the Deputy State Coroner's jurisdiction. The judges reasoned that the "born alive rule" is satisfied by any indication of independent life, and that such indicia are not confined to historical applications but can encompass advancements in medical science. Consequently, the presence of PEA was deemed sufficient to be regarded as a sign of life. Furthermore, White and Peek JJ emphasised that the jurisdiction of the Coroner's Court should be construed broadly due to the significant public benefits derived from inquests, and that questioning the born alive rule was not appropriate in this instance. The court adopted the reasoning of Spigelman CJ in a similar New South Wales case, concluding that statutory definitions of death, such as those found in the *Human Tissue Act 1983* (NSW), do not alter the common law concept of "life" for the purposes of the born alive rule, resisting the temptation to impose a "meretricious symmetry" between statutory and common law definitions.