Bar-Mordecai v The Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales (No. 1)

In the case of Bar-Mordecai v The Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales (No. 1), the applicant, Bar-Mordecai, sought leave to institute further proceedings against the respondent, the Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales, in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The applicant had previously issued two summonses for leave to file notices of motion in proceedings seeking summary judgment for possession against him. The applicant sought leave to cross-examine witnesses and to issue a Notice to Produce. The case raised questions about the application of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) and the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (NSW).

The court had to decide whether the applicant had established a prima facie ground for the Notice to Produce and whether the documents sought to be produced were relevant to any issue on the summary judgment application. The court also had to consider whether the applicant had a basis for his claim. The court held that the applicant had not made out a prima facie case that the documents were relevant to the issues in the summary judgment application. The court further held that the applicant had no basis for his claim, and therefore, refused leave to institute further proceedings.

The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated that the Notice to Produce was necessary to establish a prima facie case or to address any issues in the summary judgment application. The court held that the applicant's claim was without merit and that the proceedings were vexatious. The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated that the documents sought to be produced were relevant to the issues in the summary judgment application. The court held that the applicant had no basis for his claim and that the proceedings were vexatious. The court refused leave to institute further proceedings.

The court made an order that the applicant's application for leave to institute further proceedings be refused. The court also made an order that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application, to be paid within 28 days.