Bannister, M.B. v See, J.

Case [1982] FCA 288


CATCHWORDS

Administrative

Law

-

Repa t r i a t ion -

e n t i t l e m e n t t o

War

Widow's

pension

-

effect

of

amendments

t o t h e R e p a t r i a t i o n

-

Act,

1920 concerning onus of proof - renewed app l i ca t ion

for pension - meaning of

ttreviewtl

i n s.31

of the Act.

Adminis t ra t ive Decis ions

(Judicial

Review) Act, 1977

ss. 5, 7.

Repatr ia t ion Acts Amendment Act, 1977

s.12

Repatr ia t ion Acts

Amendment Ac$

1979

s.11

MAVIS BEATRICE BANNISTER v. J O H N SEE and ASHLEY COOK

I N THE

FEDERAL

COURT

OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN

AUSTRALIA

DISTRICT

REGISTRY

WAG No.16 o f 1982

GENERAL DIVISION

l

MAVIS BEATRICE BANNISTER

Appellant

AND:

-

JOHN SEE and ASHLEY COOK

Respondents

O R D E R

. .

CORAM :

FOX, WOODWARD and FRANK1 JJ.

DATE :

16 December 1982

WHERE

MADE:

P e r t h

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The appeal i s allowed.

2.

The respondents

for thwi th

no t i fy

the

Pres

ident

o f t he Repa t r i a t ion

Review

Tribunal

of

t h e

lodgement

of

the app l i can t ' s app l i ca t ion he re in .

3 .

The respondents as soon as prac t icable

forward

to

t h e s a i d P r e s i d e n t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n a n d a l l

records and other documents under the control

2.

of

t h e Department

of Veterans ' Affairs

r e l a t i n g t o t h e d e c i s i o n t o

which

t h e

a p p l i c a t i o n r e l a t e s .

4 .

The

respondents

pay

the

appel lant ' s

taxed

c o s t s of

t h e a p p l i c a t i o n

for

an order

for

review and

o f

t h i s a p p e a l .

I N THE FEDERAL COURT CF

AUSTRALIA

WESTERN

AUSTRALIA

DISTRICT

REGISTRY

WAG No. 16 of 1902

GENERAL DIVISION

BETWEEN :

MAVIS BEATRICE BANNISTER

Appellant

AND:

-

JOHN SEE and ASHLEY COOK

Respondents

FELSONS

FOR

JUDGMENT

FOX J.

The

f a c t s i n

t h i s

ma t t e r and r e l evan t s t a tu to ry

p r o v i s i o n s a r e s e t o u t i n t h e

judgment

of

Woodward

J.

I

agree with his conclusions and the reasons he has

given for them.

A s we

a r e d i f f e r i n g

from Toohey J.,

I should

say something myself of

my

v iew of the s i tua t ion .

It has not been submit ted that

s.31(1)

of

the Repat r ia t ion Act

1920

can only be brought into

opera t ion a t t h e i n s t a n c e

of

t h e Commission,

nor has

L.

it

has been suggested that any of the exclusion provis ions

of s.31(3) apply.

I agree wi th

the

learned

judge

tha t

flreviewtl i n S. 31 (1 )

means

reconsideration, but "changed

circumstances"

may

n o t i n my

opinion be an adequate

way

of descr ib ing

the pre-condi t ions

to

rev iew.

It

is

n o t n e c e s s a r y i n t h i s c a s e t o a r r i v e a t

a

decision on

t h i s matter.

Cer t a in ly

the sub - sec t ion

is not

intended

merely

to provide an avenue

for

f u r t h e r a p p e a l , a f t e r

t he re has been

a

de te rmina t ion by

t h e Commission

o r t h e

Tribunal.

I t can be

assumed

that obviously hopeless

o r

mere ly vexa t ious appl ica t ions

would

be excluded from

review.

It

is

o f s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a t t h e r e v i e w

i s

of

"any assessment, decision

o r

determination

i n r e l a t i o n

to pens ionf1 .

The

scope of

reviewzble matters

is

wide.

It

i s

p l a i n

t h a t

the r ev iew can l ead to r e su l t s o f

importance;

sub-section

(2 ) makes

it

c l e a r t h a t

revocat ion and v a r i a t i o n of an assessment

of pension

are

included.

The

submiss ion

tha t

s.31

i s n o t p a r t

of

the appea l machinery of the

Act

is

ra the r bes ides the

poin t .

It

seems reasonably clear, despite

language

t o t h e c o n t r a r y

i n some

documents,

t h a t t h e r e

was

a

review.

\illat

was

done,

as evidenced

by

the

Commission's

Reasons

fo r Dec i s ion ,

was

a

cons idera t ion of the fac ts

and

mer i t s o f t he ma t t e r .

3 .

When

it goes beyond

i t s screening funct ion,

t he Commission i s embarking

upon

the

review.

It would

be

a

s t r ange r e su l t , hav ing

i n mind

the scope

o f

i t s

power when

it does so,

i f an appeal were not

open t o

an

unsuccess fu l app l i can t

fo r

a

pension.

Section

107VC(l)

r e f e r s t o t h e

r e f u s a l o f

a

claim.

The

appl ica t ion under

s.31

can properly be regarded as

a

claim.

I n

t h e p r e s e n t c a s e t h e r e

was

i n substance

and

i n f a c t t h e r e f u s a l o f

Mrs.

Barnis te rns c la im.

A

second

refusal,

no

doubt ,

but

still a re fusa l .

The

a p p e a l r e a l l y

turns

on

t h i s a s p e c t ,

namely

t h a t of

a s ses s ing and

cha rac t e r i s ing

what

t he

Commission

did.

I

am

o f

t h e view

t h a t s . l O 7 V C

app l i e s and

t h a t

Krs.

Bannis te r ' s appl ica t ion should be dea l t

w i t h

accordingly.

I N THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN

AUSTRALIA

DISTRICT REGISTRY

WAG No. 16 of 1982

GENERAL DIVISION

BETWEEN :

MAVIS BEATRICE

BANNISTER

Appellant

AND:

J O H N SEE and ASHLEY

COOK

Respondents

REASONS

FOR

JUDGMENT

WOODWARD J.

This i s an appeal from

a decision by

Toohey J.

dismissing

an

appl icat ion, under the Adminis t ra t ive

Dec i s ions ( Jud ic i a l

Review)

A c t 1977,

by t h e widow of

a

former serviceman

who

i s

seeking to reopen the ques t ion

of

h e r e n t i t l e m e n t t o

a

pens ion pursuant to the

Repa t r i a t ion Act

1920.

The appl icant ! s husband died

on 21 March 1975.

She lodged

a

c la im for acceptance

of h i s d e a t h

as being

r e l a t e d t o h i s

war

service. That claim

was

r e j e c t e d

by

a

Repatr ia t ion Board.

An

appea l

t o

the Repa t r i a t ion

Commission

was

dismissed.

A

fu r the r appea l

t o

a

War

2.

Pensions Ent i t lement

Appeal

Tribunal-was a l s o u l t ima te ly

dismissed

on

2 May

1978, b u t no t before the mat te r had

been remit ted

t o t he Repa t r i a t ion

Commission

f o r it t o

recons ider

i t s

d e c i s i o n i n t h e l i g h t

o f

fresh evidence

produced by the appl icant in support of her c la im.

It

w i l l be

seen tha t these var ious proceedings

took place

over a p e r i o d o f

some

three years .

Between

the recons idera t ion by

the

Repa t r i a t ion Commission

and

t h e f i n a l d i s m i s s a l

o f

t h e

appl icantss appeal by the

Mar

Pensions Entit lement Appeal Tribunal,

some

very

s i g n i f i c a n t

amendments

were

made

to the Repa t r i a t ion Ac t .

I n p a r t i c u l a r ,

a new

s.47

came in to fo rce on

1

October

1977, which

provided,

i n sub - sec t ion

(Z),

“The

Commission,

Board,

Appesl

Tribunal

or Assessment Appeal

Tribunal s h a l l

g r a n t t h e

claim

or

a p p l i c a t i o n or

allow

the appea l ,

as t h e c a s e

may

be,

unless

it

is

s a t i s f i e d ,

beyond reasonable

doubt,

tha t

t h e r e a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t

grounds for gran t ing the c la im or

a p p l i c a t i o n

or

al lowing the appeal” .

Fu r the r amendments

t o t h e Act

came

i n t o

operat ion on

1 July 1979.

These amended s.47(2) without

changing

i t s

substance and,

among

o ther th ings ,

e s t a b l i s h e d a

new

Repat r ia t ion

Review

Tr ibuna l t o t ake

the p l ace o f t he

War

Pensions Entit lement Appeal

Tribunals, and i n sub-paragraph 2(a)

of

s.l07VH,

requi red

3.

the Tr ibuna l

t o se t a s i d e any decis ion refusing

a

claim

o r a p p l i c a t i o n f o r p e n s i o n 9 m l e s s

it

i s

s a t i s f i e d ,

beyond

reasonable doubt , tha t there were insuf f ic ien t

grounds

for

gran t ing the c l a im

o r appl ica t ion" .

The

effect of these

and

o t h e r r e l a t e d

amendments

t o t h e Act was considered by

Toohey J.,

t h e Full

Court

o f t h i s Cour t , and f ina l ly by the

High

C o u r t , i n

Repa t r i a t ion Commission

v

-

Law (1980) 29 A.L.R.

64,

(1980) 31 A.L.R.

140, and (1981) 36 A.L.R.

411.

It w a s i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e s e

amendments

and

dec is ions

t h a t the appl icant sought

t o renew h e r claim

f o r

a

pension. She did

s o

through

a

l e t t e r w r i t t e n b y

t h e Legacy

advocate,

Mr. I . H .

Davies, on 1 J u l y 1981.

Tha t l e t t e r , omi t t i ng fo rma l pa r t s ,

was

i n

the fo l lowing

terms,

"Application is made for acceptance

o f t h e

claim by Mrs.

Bann i s t e r fo r

a War

Widows

Pension.

This

appl icat ion

i s made

under Sec t ions

31

and/or

107VL( 1) of the

R e p a t r i a t i o n Act

and

t h e I t s u f f i c i e n t

reasont1 of "special c i rcumstancest ' are c l a i m e d t o b e t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e

p rov i s ions

o f

t he Repa t r i a t ion

A c t now

given by the

Full

Federal Court .

The

ex-member

died from Motor Neurone

Disease and medical reports were submitted

from

two

l e a d i n g a u t h o r i t i e s

-

Professor

B.

Kakulas -

world recognised authori ty on

neu ro log ica l d i seases ;

and

Professor

R.L.

Dawkins, Professor of

Immunology,

University of W.A.

and Queen Elizabeth

Medical

Centre.

4 .

Professor Kakulas

drew

a t t e n t i o n

t o t h e

unknown

o r i g i n

of

t h e d i s e a s e

and,

by

inference,

supported

acceptance

of the claim because

of

the

doubt

regard ing or ig in ; and Professor

Dawkins

( a t t h a t t i m e

D r .

Dawkins)

po in ted out

tha t an accep ted

d i s a b i l i t y c o u l d

parade

as M.N.D.

and vice versa .

If

t h e l a t t e r o p i n i o n

i s c o r r e c t ,

i n this case an A/D parades as, what

l a t e r became,

t h e

f a t a l

c o n d i t i o n .

In

any

case it i s claimed that no reason-

able man

can.be convinced beyond

reasonable doubt

that there is no

subs t ance to

t h i s

claim

-

p a r t i c u l a r l y

as n e i t h e r o f t h e

eminent medical

men

are p r e p a r e d t o

deny

it.

It

i s r e q u e s t e d t h a t t h e

widow's

claim

be granted for thwi th .

The

Repa t r i a t ion

Commission

r e p l i e d t o t h a t

l e t t e r on 12 November

1981 saying,

among o ther th ings ,

"The Commission has dec ided tha t

it

w i l l

r econs ider the case under sec t ion

31

of

the Repa t r i a t ion Act.

This case has been programmed

for

a t t e n t i o n ,

however,

ca ses

a r e d e a l t

with b y t h e

Commission

in ch rono log ica l

order.

In

view

o f

t h e c u r r e n t

workload

being experienced by the

Commission,

a

d e c i s i o n i n t h i s c a s e

may

be delayed

f o r a

sho r t pe r iod .

I would l i k e t o

a s su re you

t h a t e v e r y e f f o r t

w i l l be

made

t o r e s o l v e t h i s

case with a

minimum of delay."

By

th i s

t ime the

High Court had dismissed the

appea l i n Law's Case.

It did so on 16 October 1981 .

5 .

On 22 December 1981 t h e Commission wrote t o

t h e a p p l i c a n t ,

"A

Repa t r i a t ion Commission

has

noted your reques t for recons idera t ion

of your c la im for acceptance of your

husband ' s dea th as due to h is se rv ice .

A f t e r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t h e

Commission

has dec ided tha t su f f i c i en t

r eason does no t ex i s t t o war ran t

it

reviewing the

War

Pensions Entit lement

Appeal Tribunal decision of

2

May

1978

i n r e s p e c t o f

the memberss death.

A

copy of the Commission's reasons

f o r i t s dec i s ion i s enclosed.

I

However, your case may be

re-opened

a

t

any time by the submission,

i n w r i t i n g ,

of further evidence which

would

have been

r e l e v a n t t o t h e

Commission's decision.

This evidence

may be medical

o r l a y ,

i n the form of a c e r t i f i c a t e o f ( s i c ) s ta tement which might he lp re la te your

husbands s

d e a t h

t o h i s

s e r v i c e .

.

The enclosed

'Reasons for Decisions dated

9

December

1981,

were

s e t o u t

i n a

two-page document which

canvassed the evidence to which

Y r .

D a v i e s ' l e t t e r

had

drawn

attention and concluded

!'The

Commission

i s s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e

judgment by the

Full

Court of the Federal

Court

i n t h e c a s e o f R e p a t r i a t i o n

Commission

v.

Nancy Law does not

i n any way a f f e c t t h e

p rev ious cons ide ra t ions g iven to the r epor t s

by

Professors Kakulas

and

Dawkins.

The

de te rmin ing au tho r i t i e s who previously considered the widowss claims did not base

their decis ions on misunderstandings

o r

mis in t e rp re t a t ions o f t he Repa t r i a t ion

Act.

6 .

For

these r easons ,

t he

Commission,

having had

f u l l r e g a r d t o t h e

judgment

by the

Full

Court of the Federal Court

i n

t he case o f Repa t r i a t ion

Commission

v.

Nancy

Law,

d o e s n o t c o n s i d e r t h a t

s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n e x i s t s t o w a r r a n t

fur ther rev iew under Sec t ion

31

of

t h e

Repa t r i a t ion Act

i n r e s p e c t

of

t h e widow's

claim.

On

11 January 1982 M r .

Davies wrote to the

Repa t r i a t ion

Review

Tribunal , appeal ing against

' I the

dec i s ion o f

the Repa t r i a t ion

Commission

as

se t o u t i n

the

'Reasons' dated

9

December

1981 no t t o r ev iew

o r

g ran t

t h i s

appeal".

The

l e t t e r p u r p o r t e d t o b e w r i t t e n

p u r s u a n t t o

s . l O 7 V C

o f t he Repa t r i a t ion

Act,

which

i n

p a r t p r o v i d e s

Where the

Commission has made a

d e c i s i o n r e f u s i n g

a

claim

by

a

person

f o r a pension

.... t h a t p e r s o n

may

....

make

a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e T r i b u n a l f o r

a

review

of

t he dec i s ion o f t he

Commission."

Where

an app l i ca t ion

i s made

unde r tha t s ec t ion ,

s.lO7VF'

of the

Act

r equ i r e s the Sec re t a ry o f t he

Department

o f

Ve te rans ' Af fa i r s t o no t i fy the P res iden t o f t he

Tribunal , within

21

d a y s , t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n h a s

been

lodged,

and

then,

as

soon as

pract

icable

,

to

forward

t o

t h e P r e s i d e n t

the

a p p l i c a t i o n a n d a l l r e l e v a n t m a t e r i a l .

7.

The

s e c r e t a r y h a s f a i l e d o r r e f u s e d t o p u t

the mat te r before the Tr ibunal , c la iming tha t the

Commission's

l a t e s t d e c i s i o n

was

n o t

'la

dec is ion re fus ing

a claim by

a pe r son fo r

a pensiont1, i n the terms of

S. 107VC,

and

s o no

appea l l ay to the Tr ibuna l .

The

a p p l i c a n t s e e k s t o r e v i e w t h a t f a i l u r e o r

re fusa l on the ground tha t there has been

a

f a i l u r e t o

make

a

d e c i s i o n w i t h i n t h e

meaning of

s.7

o f t h e J u d i c i a l

Review Act.

It would seem t o have been

more appropr ia te

for

t he g round o f app l i ca t ion to have r e fe r r ed to

a

w r o n g f u l d e c i s i o n n o t t o p u t t h e m a t t e r b e f o r e t h e

Tribunal, and

t o have r e l i e d upon s.5

of

t h e Act.

However,

no object ion has been taken to the form of the

appl ica t ion .

_ .

The

determination of

th i s matter depends largely

upon t h e meaning and

effect of

s.31(1)

of the Repat r ia t ion

Act 1920.

That sub-section provides,

Whenever

it

a p p e a r s t o t h e

Commission

that , under

t h i s

Act , suf f ic ien t

reason

exists

for reviewing any assessment,

dec is ion

or

d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o

pens ion (o ther than

a

serv ice pens ion) the

Commission may

review the assessment,

dec i s ion or

determination.

a.

Toohey

J.

took the view that the sub-sect ion

l lcontemplates, not an appeal

from

t h e

or ig ina l assessment , dec is ion

o r

de te rmina t ion but

a

recons idera t ion of

t ha t a s ses smen t , dec i s ion

o r

determination

I1

because of subsequent events

....

H i s Honour went on,

" A s a resu l t of a review under

s.31

t h e Commission may vary or revoke an

assessment , decis ion

o r

determination

o r

of course

it may

leave that assessment ,

d e c i s i o n

o r determination

stand.

If,

fo l lowing a review under

s.31

t h e

Commission

d e c i d e s t o l e a v e

unchanged an

e a r l i e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n r e f u s i n g

a

claim

for a pension,

I do no t t h ink

that is

i tsel f

'a

dec i s ion r e fus ing

a

claim by

a

person €or a pension ' within

s.lO7VC.

That dec is ion has a l ready been

made

and

was

sub jec t t o appea l unde r Pa r t

I11

A

o f t he

Act;

a l l t h a t t h e

Commission

has

done

i s t o l e a v e t h a t d e c i s i o n

unchanged

....

It may b e t h a t

i f , following a

review under

S. 31 , t h e g r a n t of

a pension

i s

revoked, there has been

a

dec is ion

r e f u s i n g a

claim within

s.IO~VC.~~

(His Honour

went

on

t o s a y t h a t h e

expressed no

view

on

t h i s m a t t e r . )

If

Toohey J. was r i g h t i n

so holding, then

c l e a r l y t h e

applicantss

a t tempted appea l to the

Repa t r i a t ion Review

Tribunal was

misconceived and her

a p p l i c a t i o n u n d e r t h e J u d i c i a l

Review

Act must

f a i l .

9.

Unfortunately

I

f ind myself unable to agree

with Toohey J.

on

t h e p l a c e o f

s.31

with in the genera l

scheme o f t he

Act.

I b e l i e v e t h a t

an actual

review

of

a

previous assessment , decis ion

o r determination

which

takes place because of subsequent events

-

whether those

events be

a

change

i n t h e a p p l i c a n t s s c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,

a

change

i n

t h e

law,

the ava i l ab i l i t y o f € re sh ev idence

o r a

change i n t h e s t a t e

of medical knowledge

- w i l l

g i v e r i s e t o

a

r igh t of appea l to the Tr ibunal under

P a r t

I11 A

o f t he

A c t i n appropr i a t e cases .

I

t h i n k t h a t t h i s

mus t c lear ly be

so

i n t h e

case where

a pension i s revoked, which

Toohey J.

r e fe r r ed

t o without expressing

a concluded opinion.

It i s a l s o

t h e case where t h e Commission "has made a decis ion

r e f u s i n g t o a l t e r t h e e x i s t i n g a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e r a t e

o f pension

o f

a

member

of

the Forces1 ' (see s . l07VD(l)(b)) .

The

r i g h t t o

get

back

to the Tr ibuna l a f t e r an unsuccess fu l

appeal,

i f

it

is

des i red to submi t fur ther ev idence ,

is

also recognized by

s.10W1.

The

a p p l i c a t i o n by

t h e Legacy advocate

i n t h i s

case,

of 1 J u l y 1981, was i n

t e r m s

a

€resh

appl icat ion

f o r a pension.

More impor t an t ,

t h i s

was the

substance

of

t h e a p p l i c a t i o n .

10.

The

f a c t t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n i n v o l v e d t h e

I

Commission

s t a r t i n g from the p o i n t o f

a

previous adverse

dec is ion ,

and reviewing the correctness of that decis ion

i n t h e l i g h t

of some alleged changed circumstances

which

g a v e ' s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n t t o

j u s t i f y

the review, does not

a l t e r

the subs tance of

the

matter.

A

r e - s t a t e d r e f u s a l

t o r e c o g n i z e

a

death

as

se rv ice - r e l a t ed

is,

i n my

view,

Ita dec i s ion r e fus ing a claim by a person for a pensiont1

w i t h i n t h e

meaning of

s . l O 7 V C .

T h i s approach which

I t a k e t o

s.31

(which I

concede has to be based

on

gene ra l impress ions a s t o

t h e p o l i c y o f t h e

Act

r a the r t han on any ca re fu l ana lys i s

of

the

words

used)

would

seem

t o b e s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y

the a l lowing of th i s appea l .

However counse l fo r

the respondents re l ied

on

an argument before

us which was

re fer red to by counse l

f o r

the

app l i can t , bu t ce r t a in ly no t deve loped by

counsel €or the respondents , before

Toohey J.

This

was

t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e r e

was

no

a c t u a l

rev

iew pursuant

to

s.31 of

the

Act i n t h i s case.

A l l

tha t occur red ,

it

i s s a i d ,

was

a

cons idera t ion of the

p o s s i b i l i t y o f

a

review and

a

d e c i s i o n n o t

t o conduct

one.

This,

it was

argued,

f e l l w e l l s h o r t o f

any

d e c i s i o n t o r e f u s e

a

pension claim.

11.

I n my

view there

i s fo rce i n t h i s submission.

If

t h e Commission d e c l i n e s t o

embark

on

any review,

because

it

i s

obvious on the face of the reques t

o r

on

s i m p l e i n q u i r y t h a t t h e r e a r e

no

adequate changed

c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o c o n s t i t u t e

' s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n ' f o r

a

review, then

I b e l i e v e no appeal would l i e t o the

Tribunal.

The

l e g a l i t y

and

good

fa i th of any such

I

dec is ion could , o f course , be tes ted under the

Adminis t ra t ive Decis ions ( Judic ia l

Review)

A c t 1977.

There w i l l sometimes be

a

f i n e l i n e

between consideration

whether

o r n o t t o

review

and an actual

review.

The

Commission

s h o u l d t a k e p a i n s t o d i s t i n g u i s h

the

two

processes.

B u t I

do

n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e

was

a

r e f u s a l

t o r e v i e w

i n the present case .

I

s a y t h i s i n s p i t e o f

the absence of any formal hearing, as contemplated

i

n

some

cases by

s.32

of the Act ,

and the use

o f such

expressions

as

Ifthe Commission

has

d e c i d e d t h a t s u f f i c i e n t

r eason does no t ex i s t t o war ran t

it

reviewing ( the

e a r l i e r d e c i s i o n ) 1 1 i n t h e l e t t e r o f

22

December

1981,

and

!Ithe

Commission

.... does not cons ider tha t

s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n

exists

to warran t fur ther rev iew under

s.31

..l1

i n the accompanying 9Reasons €or Decision' .

This

l a s t

sen tence

seems

t o s u g g e s t t h a t ,

i n t h i s c a s e ,

t h e r e has

been

a

p a r t i a l o r incomplete review, which

may

wel l

b e t h e t r u e p o s i t i o n .

12.

I

t h i n k t h a t , w i t h i n t h e

meaning of

s.31,

t h e

Commission

d id ' rev iew' the ear l ie r de te rmina t ion

-

-

a s it

should have done

-

i n t h e l i g h t

o f

t h e s i g n i f i c a n t

changes

i n t h e l a w

which

may

have only been fully

understood

as

a

r e s u l t o f t h e d e c i s i o n s i n R e p a t r i a t i o n

Commission v -

Law

(above). Having reviewed

t h a t

de te rmina t ion , the

Commission dec ided to

affirm

it.

For the reasons

I have already given,

I b e l i e v e t h a t

an appeal

l i e s from

t h a t d e c i s i o n t o t h e R e p a t r i a t i o n

Tribunal.

I

would

therefore uphold the appeal ,

make

t h e

orders sought by the appel lan t

and

d i r e c t t h a t t h e

respondents pay the appel lant ' s taxed costs of the

appea l and the appl ica t ion .

I certlfy that fhi: and the

'/

, preceomg Fa,-:

are a true copy of the

: Reasons ior Juignen! herein oi the Ronourable

Mr. Juslice A E \'.'ocox::ard

I N THE

FEDERAL

COURT

OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

WAG No. 16 o f 1982

GENERAL DIVISION

BETWEEN :

MAVIS BEATRICE BANNISTER

Appellant

AND:

JOHN SEE and ASHLEY COOK

Respondents

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

FRANK1 J.

I agree wi th the reasons

for judgment o€

Woodward J.

and wi-ch t h e o r d e r s

which he proposes.

Details
AGLC
Bannister, M.B. v See, J. [1982] FCA 288
Case
[1982] FCA 288
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Bannister, M.B. v See, J. involved a widow, Mavis Beatrice Bannister, appealing against a decision of the Reparation Commission which refused her claim for a War Widow's pension. The legal issues before the court included whether the Commission's refusal to review the case constituted a decision refusing a pension claim, and if so, whether an appeal to the Reparation Review Tribunal was appropriate. The court held that the Commission's refusal to review the case constituted a decision refusing a pension claim, and that an appeal to the Tribunal was indeed appropriate under the relevant sections of the Reparation Act. The court allowed the appeal, ordered the respondents to notify the Tribunal of the application and to forward all relevant records and documents to the Tribunal, and directed the respondents to pay the appellant's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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