Bakarich v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (No 3)

In *Bakarich v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (No 3)*, the applicant sought the recusal of the judge presiding over the proceedings on the grounds of ostensible bias. The respondent was the Commonwealth Bank of Australia.

The central legal issue before the court was whether there was a sufficient demonstration of a logical connection between the facts giving rise to the application and the possibility of bias on the part of the judge. The court was required to determine if the circumstances presented were such that a fair-minded lay observer, having considered the facts, would apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the issues before them.

Campbell JA refused the application, finding that no such logical connection had been demonstrated. The court applied the well-established principles governing applications for recusal, which require more than mere suspicion or conjecture. The applicant failed to establish that the apprehended bias was reasonably possible, meaning the threshold for recusal was not met.

The application to recuse the judge was refused.