Baisman & Cartmill

In this case, Mr Baisman appeals against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing his Initiating Application seeking to revisit consent orders concerning the care, welfare, and development of his two children, X and Y, with Ms Cartmill. The original orders were made on 11 April 2019, following the separation of the parties. The orders provided that the mother have sole parental responsibility for both children, who would live with her and spend no time with the father. The father sought to revisit those orders, seeking equal shared parental responsibility for the children, and that the orders effecting a prohibition on him spending time with the children, and imposing restraints on his communication with them, be discharged. The mother sought that the father’s Initiating Application be dismissed, both on a final and interim basis. The primary judge dismissed the application and made orders in relation to costs.

The court was required to determine whether the primary judge erred in applying the rule in Rice & Asplund and whether there was a substantial or significant change in circumstances justifying a revisitation of the consent orders. The court was also required to determine whether the primary judge erred in his assessment of the father’s case and whether he applied the correct legal principles in making his decision.

The court found that the primary judge did not err in applying the rule in Rice & Asplund. The court noted that the father did not object to the mother relying upon her affidavit, despite the fact that it contained material that was contrary to his case. The court also found that the primary judge did not err in his assessment of the father’s case, and that he applied the correct legal principles in making his decision. The court found that there was no substantial or significant change in circumstances justifying a revisitation of the consent orders.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs in the sum of $10,000. The court noted that appellate intervention in relation to costs orders is only mandated if there is either obvious injustice or wrong application of principle. In this case, the court found that neither of these criteria was met.