Attorney-General v Newman

In the case of Attorney-General v Newman, the respondent, Brenton James Newman, faced a legal challenge concerning his status as a dangerous sexual offender under the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld). The Attorney-General sought preliminary orders under the Act, which could lead to Newman being precluded from applying for parole in the future. The central issue before the court was whether the preliminary orders could be made if Newman was on parole and whether the making of these orders should be adjourned to allow Newman to apply for parole. The court had to consider the implications of the Corrective Services Act 2006 and the ministerial guidelines on the parole process, particularly in light of the potential impact on Newman's parole application.

The court addressed the question of whether it retained jurisdiction to make the preliminary orders after Newman's release on parole. It concluded that the court's jurisdiction to make such orders was not contingent on the timing of the parole application. The court also evaluated the prospects of Newman's parole application being successful, noting that the decision rested with the Parole Board. However, the court highlighted the importance of considering the ministerial guidelines in the parole process, which emphasised community safety as the highest priority. The court found that the guidelines did not necessarily bind the Parole Board to follow them, but they did provide a framework for decision-making.

In reaching its decision, the court refused the application for an adjournment, finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Newman posed a serious danger to the community. The court ordered that the application for a Division 3 Order be set for a final hearing on 3 December 2018. It also mandated that Newman undergo examinations by two psychiatrists, Dr Scott Harden and Dr Josephine Sundin, who were to prepare independent reports in accordance with the Act. The court further directed that the psychiatrists could give oral evidence in person. The final orders included setting the date for the final hearing, mandating psychiatric examinations, allowing the psychiatrists to give oral evidence, and granting liberty to apply.