Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal concerning a by-law made by the Corporation of the City of Adelaide that prohibited preaching and distributing printed matter on any road without permission. The Attorney-General (SA) appealed against a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, which had found the by-law to be invalid. The dispute centred on whether the by-law impermissibly burdened the implied freedom of political communication guaranteed by the Australian Constitution.

The legal issues before the High Court included whether the by-law effectively burdened the freedom of political communication, and if so, whether it was reasonably appropriate and adapted to achieving a legitimate end in a manner compatible with the system of representative and responsible government. The Court also considered whether the by-law making power under the *Local Government Act 1934* (SA) had been exceeded, and whether the by-law represented a reasonable and proportionate exercise of that power.

The High Court reasoned that the implied freedom of political communication is not an absolute personal right but rather a restriction on legislative power, meaning some restrictions may be permissible. The Court applied the test established in *Lange* and explained in *Monis v The Queen* to determine if the by-law exceeded the limits of this constitutional constraint. The Court disagreed with the Full Court's view that any requirement for advance permission is incompatible with the freedom.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Full Court and the District Court of South Australia. The application to challenge the validity of the by-law was dismissed, and the appeal to the Full Court concerning the by-law was also dismissed.