SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Attorney-General of the State of Queensland v Legal Services Commissioner & Anor [2018] QCA 198
PARTIES:
ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(appellant/applicant)
v
LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER
(first respondent)
HAROLD WARNER SHAND
(second respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 5758 of 2017
QCAT No 163 of 2013DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal – Further Orders
ORIGINATING COURT:
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal – [2017] QCAT 159
DELIVERED ON:
28 August 2018
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
Heard on the papers
JUDGES:
Morrison and McMurdo JJA and Brown J
ORDERS:
1. The Attorney-General be given leave to apply for an order that the second respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, excluding the costs of and incidental to her application which is the subject of this judgment.
2. The second respondent’s costs of the application which is the subject of this judgment be reserved.
3. The second respondent have three weeks from the date of these orders to file and serve written submissions in response to the application for costs.
CATCHWORDS:
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – POWERS OF COURT – COSTS – where the Court allowed the appellant’s appeal – where the appellant sought no order for costs in her notice of appeal or outline of submissions – where the appellant sought leave to make an application for the costs of the appeal when the judgment was delivered – where the second respondent opposed the application for leave – where the appellant was allowed to file written submissions as to why leave to apply for costs should be granted – where paragraph 52 of Practice Direction 3 of 2013 provides that parties wishing to make submissions on costs must do so in their written outlines of argument and/or orally at the hearing – whether the appellant should be granted leave to apply for costs
Attorney-General of the State of Queensland v Legal Services Commissioner & Anor; Legal Services Commissioner v Shand [2018] QCA 66, related
COUNSEL:
P Dunning QC SG, with F Nagorcka, for the appellant
T P Pincus for the second respondentSOLICITORS:
Crown Law for the appellant
Motteram Lawyers for the second respondent
MORRISON JA: I agree with the reasons of McMurdo JA and the orders his Honour proposes.
McMURDO JA: This appeal was heard and decided with an appeal by the Legal Services Commissioner. In the Commissioner’s notice of appeal and outline of argument, the costs of the appeal were sought against Mr Shand. But no order for costs was sought in the Attorney-General’s notice of appeal or outline of submissions.
When the judgment was delivered, the Attorney-General sought leave to make an application for the costs of the appeal. That was opposed by Mr Shand. The Attorney-General was allowed to file a written submission as to why leave to apply for costs should be granted. This Court has received that submission and a written submission in response on behalf of Mr Shand, in which leave was opposed.
It is submitted for Mr Shand that leave should not be given because otherwise the requirements of paragraph 52 of the Court’s Practice Direction[1] would be rendered meaningless. That submission goes too far, but it is important that the Practice Direction be enforced where that can be done without causing an injustice in a particular case. It must be accepted that it was by an oversight that costs were not sought. The question is whether there is any relevant prejudice which would be caused by allowing a costs order to be sought at this stage.
[1]Practice Direction Number 3 of 2013.
For Mr Shand, it is said that there is a prejudice here because the Commissioner has already been awarded his costs. That outcome was not opposed by Mr Shand, but it is said that he should not have to pay the costs of two appeals, and that having lost the opportunity to resist a costs order on the Commissioner’s appeal, it is unfair that he be exposed to the risk that he would have to pay two sets of costs.
In my view, that is an argument to why he should not be ordered to pay the Attorney-General’s costs, but it is not a persuasive argument for refusing leave to the Attorney-General to seek the costs of her appeal. I would order that:
1.The Attorney-General be given leave to apply for an order that the second respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, excluding the costs of and incidental to her application which is the subject of this judgment.
2.The second respondent’s costs of the application which is the subject of this judgment be reserved.
3.The second respondent have three weeks from the date of these orders to file and serve written submissions in response to the application for costs.
BROWN J: I agree with the reasons given by McMurdo JA, and the orders proposed by his Honour.
- AGLC
- Attorney-General of the State of Queensland v Legal Services Commissioner [2018] QCA 198
- Case
- [2018] QCA 198
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court centred around the proper procedure for making an application for costs in the context of an appeal. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the appellant should be allowed to make an application for costs, despite not having made such an application in her initial notice of appeal or outline of submissions. The court also had to consider whether the appellant’s application for leave to apply for costs should be permitted, despite the fact that paragraph 52 of Practice Direction 3 of 2013 states that parties wishing to make submissions on costs must do so in their written outlines of argument and/or orally at the hearing.
In allowing the appellant’s appeal and granting leave for the application for costs, the court held that the proper procedure for making an application for costs in the context of an appeal is not strictly limited to the initial notice of appeal or outline of submissions. The court found that the appellant’s application for leave to apply for costs was not precluded by the provisions of Practice Direction 3 of 2013, as the practice direction was not intended to be an exhaustive statement of the court’s powers in relation to costs. The court emphasised that the primary concern in such matters is to ensure that the proceedings are dealt with justly and expeditiously. In this case, the court found that it was appropriate to grant the appellant leave to apply for costs, as doing so would not cause any significant delay or prejudice to the second respondent.
The court’s orders were as follows: the Attorney-General was given leave to apply for an order that the second respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, excluding the costs of and incidental to the application for costs; the second respondent’s costs of the application for costs were reserved; and the second respondent was required to file and serve written submissions in response to the application for costs within three weeks from the date of the orders.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Attorney-General be given leave to apply for an order that the second respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, excluding the costs of and incidental to her application which is the subject of this judgment.
2. The second respondent’s costs of the application which is the subject of this judgment be reserved.
3. The second respondent have three weeks from the date of these orders to file and serve written submissions in response to the application for costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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