Attorney-General for the State of South Australia v Seven Network (Operations) Ltd (No 2)

This matter concerned an appeal before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, involving the Attorney-General for the State of South Australia as the applicant and Seven Network (Operations) Ltd as the respondent. The dispute centred on whether the Supreme Court had the power to award costs in relation to a question of law reserved for its determination from the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT).

The primary legal issue before the Full Court was whether section 72(2) of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SACAT Act) empowered the Supreme Court to make an order for costs when hearing a question of law reserved from SACAT. The respondent also argued in the alternative that, if the Supreme Court lacked this power, it should reserve the question of costs for determination by SACAT, submitting that SACAT was mandated to order the applicant to pay the respondent's costs of the review proceeding before SACAT.

The Court followed the precedent established in *Basheer*, which held that section 40(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) was excluded as a source of power to award costs in such circumstances, and that a costs order was not a "consequential order" for the purposes of the relevant provisions. The Court found that the phrase "give any consequential orders or directions considered by the Court to be appropriate to the circumstances of the case" in section 72(2) of the SACAT Act was indistinguishable from similar phrases in other legislation previously considered by the Court. Applying the reasoning from *Basheer* and *Question of Law Reserved (No 1 of 2018) [No 2]*, the Court concluded that an order for costs did not fall within the scope of "consequential orders or directions" under section 72(2) of the SACAT Act.

Consequently, the Court held that it did not have the power under section 72(2) of the SACAT Act to make an order for costs. The Court also rejected the respondent's alternative submission that SACAT was required to make an order for costs, finding that the legislative intention evinced by section 72(2) was to cover the field of the Supreme Court's powers on a reserved question of law.