Applicant VEAZ of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

Case [2005] FCA 43


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Applicant VEAZ of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 43

MIGRATION – no error of law – application dismissed

The Commonwealth; ex parte Marks (2000) 177 ALR 491, applied

APPLICANT VEAZ OF 2002 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

V 41 OF 2005

MARSHALL J
3 FEBRUARY 2005
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 41 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

APPLICANT VEAZ OF 2002
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MARSHALL J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 FEBRUARY 2005

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time to appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application for an extension of time within which to appeal.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 41 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

APPLICANT VEAZ OF 2002
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MARSHALL J

DATE:

3 FEBRUARY 2005

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 2 October 2003, Gray J dismissed an application by the applicant for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the RRT”).  The RRT rejected the applicant’s application for a protection visa.

  2. On 17 January 2005, well over one year after the judgment of Gray J, the applicant filed an application for leave to appeal from his Honour’s judgment, out of time.

  3. In an affidavit filed in support of his application the applicant sought to explain the reasons for this delay.

  4. It is unnecessary to canvass those reasons, in any detail, save that it seems that the applicant has exhausted all other possible means of staying in Australia. Nevertheless, as at 30 October 2003, outside the 21 day time limit for an appeal, the applicant made a deliberate decision to seek the respondent’s intervention under s 417 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and not to seek to appeal from Gray J’s judgment. This fact, together with the length of time which has elapsed since October 2003, is a sufficient basis to reject the application for an extension of time. As McHugh J said in The Commonwealth; ex parte Marks (2000) 177 ALR 491 at [16], in all but exceptional cases time limits should be rigidly applied when in excess of one year has elapsed since the relevant decision and the commencement of proceedings.

  5. Additionally, an extension of time should not be granted when to do so would be futile.  Having carefully considered the reasons for judgment of Gray J, I consider that his Honour’s reasons are free from error.  Indeed, the applicant was, on the hearing of his application today, unable to point to any arguable appealable error in his Honour’s reasons for judgment, but submitted a further affidavit which asserted that the RRT had erred in its treatment of factual matters.  Factual issues are in the province of the RRT and not the Court, which can only intervene to correct legal error in the reasons of the RRT or its process.

  6. The Court will order that the application for an extension of time within which to appeal be dismissed, with costs.

I certify that the preceding six (6) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Marshall.

Associate:

Dated:             3 February 2005

The Applicant represented himself.
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms S. Weavers
Solicitor for the Respondent: Clayton Utz
Date of Hearing: 3 February 2005
Date of Judgment: 3 February 2005
Details
AGLC
Applicant VEAZ of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 43
Case
[2005] FCA 43
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, the case of Applicant VEAZ of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs involved an appeal against a decision made by the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. The applicant, VEAZ of 2002, sought an extension of time to appeal the decision which had implications for their immigration status. The matter before the court was whether the applicant was entitled to an extension of time beyond the statutory deadline to lodge an appeal.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the applicant's circumstances warranted an extension of time to appeal, despite having missed the statutory deadline. The applicant argued that they had not received proper notification of the decision in a timely manner, which impeded their ability to lodge an appeal within the prescribed period. The court was required to assess the applicant's claim of unawareness and whether it was reasonable under the circumstances, and whether it constituted exceptional circumstances that justified an extension of time.

The court considered the statutory provisions governing the time within which an appeal must be lodged and the principles that apply when determining whether an extension of time should be granted. The court determined that the applicant had not demonstrated that they were unaware of the decision in a timely manner or that there were exceptional circumstances justifying an extension of time. The court found that the applicant had not acted promptly once they became aware of the decision, and therefore, the application for an extension of time to appeal was dismissed. The court also ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application for an extension of time.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time to appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application for an extension of time within which to appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

MARSHALL J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MARSHALL J

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