Anning v Anning

The case involved a dispute between Lillian Constance Anning, the widow and executrix of the estate of William Anning, and her five infant children, the respondents. William Anning, shortly before his death, executed a deed of gift voluntarily conveying his entire personal estate to his wife and children in equal shares. The widow, as executrix and legal guardian of the children, initiated an administration suit to determine whether she was to share in the personalty under the deed or as on an intestacy. The Supreme Court of Queensland had previously held that the deed constituted a valid declaration of trust, operating as an immediate irrevocable gift.

The High Court was required to determine the effectiveness of the deed of gift in transferring various categories of the deceased's personal property to the donees. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the donor had performed all necessary acts to perfect the gift according to the nature of each asset, applying the principle that an imperfect gift cannot be made effectual by treating it as a declaration of trust. The legal issues included the validity of the assignment of chattels personal, promissory notes, book debts, bank deposits, a Crown leasehold, and a partnership share, particularly in light of statutory requirements for transfer and registration.

The Court, applying the principles from *Milroy v. Lord*, held that the effectiveness of the gift depended on whether the donor had done all that was necessary on his part to place the donees in a position to claim the property. The assignment of chattels personal was found to be ineffectual due to non-compliance with the Bills of Sale Act 1891 (Qd.). The mortgage debt was not effectually conveyed as it required adherence to the Real Property Act of New South Wales. The Crown leasehold was also not effectively transferred due to the absence of a statutory instrument and registration. Promissory notes did not pass as they required endorsement. However, the partnership share, being an equitable interest, was effectually conveyed. The bank deposits and book debts were held to have passed, with differing views on the sufficiency of notice under the Judicature Act 1876 (Qd.), but ultimately considered perfected due to the donee-executrix's legal standing to receive and discharge the debts.

The Court ordered that the costs of the administration action be paid out of the estate. The appeal was allowed in part, with the High Court determining the extent to which the deed of gift had effectively transferred the various assets of the deceased's personal estate to the donees.