1835594 (Refugee)

This matter concerned an application for a protection visa by a mother and her daughter, who claimed they would face persecution if returned to Venezuela. The primary decision maker had refused their applications, finding that while the mother's claims of having voiced anti-government opinions and signed a petition critical of the government were accepted, her activities were largely private, occurred some time ago, and she had not engaged in public dissent. The delegate also did not accept claims of persecution as failed asylum seekers or the daughter's claim regarding deprivation of essential resources due to her parents' activities and past attendance at protests.

The central legal issue before the Tribunal was whether, on the accepted evidence, either applicant qualified for a protection visa as a refugee, or alternatively, on complementary protection grounds. The Tribunal considered the relevant provisions of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth), including the definitions of "refugee" and "well-founded fear of persecution," as well as the criteria for complementary protection, which involves a real risk of significant harm as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of removal to a receiving country. The Tribunal also noted its obligation to consider policy guidelines and country information assessments.

The Tribunal determined that credibility was not a critical issue in this case. It found that subsequent significant events in Venezuela, including the government's historical use of police and military to suppress dissent and the country's political and economic isolation leading to social upheaval, had fundamentally altered the circumstances. The Tribunal concluded that the applicants were unable to avail themselves of the protection of a third country.

Consequently, the Tribunal remitted the matter for reconsideration with a direction that both applicants satisfied the criterion under s 36(2)(a) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth), meaning they were to be considered refugees.