1604622 (Refugee)

This case concerned an application for a protection visa by a Ukrainian national. The applicant claimed to have witnessed a conversation between a senior police officer, identified as Mr B, and a politician, Mr C, during the 2014 Odessa clashes. She alleged that Mr B was instructed to proceed to the Trade Union Building and that subsequently, she was pressured by authorities to alter her statement, received threats, and was eventually attacked, leading her to flee Ukraine. The applicant sought protection on the grounds of Convention refugee status and complementary protection.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason, specifically political opinion, and whether she would suffer significant harm if returned to Ukraine, thereby entitling her to complementary protection. This involved assessing the applicant's credibility, the plausibility of her account in light of independent evidence concerning the events of May 2, 2014, in Odessa, and the general security and human rights situation in Ukraine. The court also considered whether the applicant's status as a cancer sufferer or survivor constituted membership of a particular social group for the purposes of Convention protection, and whether the inadequacies of the Ukrainian healthcare system amounted to significant harm under the complementary protection provisions.

The court found that the applicant was not a witness of truth. It placed significant weight on inconsistencies between her account and independent evidence regarding the location of Mr B and the timing of events, concluding that her claims of overhearing conversations and subsequent threats were not plausible. The court determined that the applicant had not established a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason, nor had she demonstrated substantial grounds for believing she would suffer significant harm if returned to Ukraine. The court noted that while the Ukrainian healthcare system faced challenges, these were general issues affecting the population and did not constitute intentional state action or omission amounting to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. The court was satisfied that the applicant left Ukraine legally and that her claims were fabricated to obtain a visa, with her actual motivation for travel being to visit her Australian son.

Consequently, the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection visa, finding that she did not satisfy the requirements of either the refugee criterion under s.36(2)(a) or the complementary protection criterion under s.36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).