Loidl v Internet Traffic Solutions Management Pty Ltd

The applicant, Loidl, appealed against a decision of the Member of the WorkCover Authority of New South Wales, who found that the appellant did not suffer a compensable injury. The dispute centred on the classification of the appellant's injury as a primary psychological injury or a secondary psychological injury resulting from a physical injury. The matter was heard by the New South Wales Court of Appeal.

The primary legal issue was whether the appellant's psychological injury was a primary injury or a secondary injury resulting from a physical injury. The appellant argued that the Medical Assessor (MA) erred by excluding impairment from what he assessed as a secondary psychological injury as a result of physical injury being an exacerbation of eczema. The appellant contended that the exacerbation of eczema was not a primary physical injury from which a secondary psychological injury had resulted but was a result of his primary psychological injury.

The Court found that the MA erred in excluding impairment from what he assessed as a secondary psychological injury. The Court held that the appellant suffered a primary psychological injury as a result of the behaviour of his supervisor, which caused him to suffer an exacerbation of his eczema. The exacerbation of eczema was not a primary physical injury from which a secondary psychological injury had resulted, but rather was a result of the appellant's primary psychological injury. Any impairment that resulted from the appellant's psychological injury and its sequelae was indivisible. The Court concluded that the appellant's psychological injury was a primary injury and any impairment resulting from it was compensable.

The Court of Appeal revoked the decision of the MAC and remitted the matter to the MAC for reconsideration in light of the findings of the Court. The Court held that the appellant was entitled to compensation for his primary psychological injury and any impairment resulting from it. The Court also held that the appellant was not required to prove that his psychological injury was caused by a specific event or series of events.